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. Robinson The peace settlement reached in January between the government and rebel forces in
El Salvador, following resolution of the Nicaraguan conflict 18 months earlier, has raised hopes
among Guatemalans that attention will shift to their country as the last remaining conflict in
Central America. However, neither the government of President Jorge Serrano nor the international
community seem disposed to attach the same importance to bringing an end to the conflict in
Guatemala as they did to those in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Guatemalans were genuinely
surprised that their country was hardly even mentioned in the congratulatory speeches given
by Latin American heads of state and other dignitaries assembled for the Jan. 16 signing of the
Salvadoran peace treaty in Mexico City's Chapultepec Palace. In attendance were all five Central
American presidents, representing the countries which signed the Esquipulas peace agreement
in August 1987. That agreement paved the way for resolution of the Nicaraguan conflict, gave
impetus to the Salvadoran negotiations, and provided the framework for what is now a nearstagnant dialogue between the Guatemalan government and rebels. Yet none of the current Central
American leaders mentioned the need to end the war in Guatemala, an armed conflict which has
persisted for 31 years, the longest-running insurgency in the hemisphere. Venezuelan President
Carlos Andres Perez exemplified this attitude. During a speech in Chapultepec, Perez proposed
that given the resolution of the Salvadoran conflict, the international community should turn
its attention to Haiti as the "last remaining issue" blocking peace and democracy in all of Latin
America. For Guatemalans, this sentiment was reinforced when US Secretary of State James Baker
made stopovers in San Salvador and Managua following the Chapultepec ceremony, ignoring
Guatemala both in his itinerary and public speeches. This was interpreted by Guatemalans as a
sign that the US does not plan to use its influence to pressure for serious peace negotiations in
their country, in contrast to the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran cases. Following high-profile coverage
of the Salvadoran accords in the Guatemalan news media, President Jorge Serrano was forced
to address the issue publicly on his return from Mexico. According to Serrano, "There are no
parallels between the Guatemalan and Salvadoran situations. The Guatemalan rebels are not at
the same level as their Salvadoran counterparts." Near-stagnant dialogue Despite dim prospects
for a speedy resolution to the armed conflict, direct negotiations between the government and
the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) were resumed January 23-25 in Mexico
City, after a four-month impasse. The talks were stalled over issues related to respect for human
rights. The peace talks began last April in Mexico City, where agreement was reached on an 11point agenda for ongoing negotiations. In July, the two sides signed the "Queretaro Accord"
on democratization, the first of the 11 points (see Robinson article, CAU 09/13/91). But in three
subsequent meetings, the negotiations became deadlocked over the second agenda item, human
rights. In November, President Serrano announced that the government was pulling out of direct
talks. But communications continued through a so-called "pendular dialogue." Msgr. Rodolfo
Quezada Toruno of the Guatemalan Bishops Conference served as message carrier, shuttling
between Guatemala City and Mexico. Toruno heads the National Reconciliation Commission
(CNR), which is acting as mediator in the negotiations. Despite the resumption of direct dialogue,
the two sides are still far from an agreement on the human rights issue. The government rejects
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as "unconstitutional" the rebels' call for a "truth and justice commission" similar to that set up in
El Salvador to investigate past human rights abuses. Government negotiators also insist that any
human rights agreement should be implemented after an overall peace accord and cease-fire is
signed. The URNG is demanding immediate human rights agreements, independent of a final
resolution to the conflict. In addition, the government delegation is unwilling to uphold the Geneva
convention rules of war, since this would imply recognition of the URNG as a belligerent force,
something the army refuses to concede. Meanwhile, the Guatemalan insurgent movement has
been expanding rapidly over the past few years. URNG leader Carlos Gonzalez recently told daily
newspaper Siglo XXI (Guatemala) that in 1991 rebel units were active in over half the nation's 22
departments and brought the war closer to the capital. The URNG claims it inflicted more than 1,700
casualties on government forces in 1991, although the government says only 22 soldiers and five
officers were killed last year. For the first time since the counterinsurgency drives of the early 1980s,
the rebels are now operating on the outskirts of the capital. This was dramatically demonstrated
in a major strike last November in the strategic and well-defended city of Esquintla, just 25 miles
southwest of Guatemala City. On Feb. 14, rebels waged an eight-hour battle with government
forces after occupying two stretches of the Pan-American Highway, just a few miles southwest
of the capital. In early January, recently-appointed Defense Minister Gen. Jose Domingo Garcia
declared that "militarily, the guerrillas no longer exist." But Guatemalan newspapers report clashes
on a near-daily basis in the southern departments of Esquintla and Retalhuela, in the eastern
jungles of El Peten, and in the highlands regions of El Quiche, San Marcos, and Quetzaltenango
departments, among other locales. According to URNG Commander Pablo Monsanto, "We can
affirm that our actions will continue because the guerrilla movement is on the ascent." He added
that the conditions which gave rise to armed insurgency in the first place remain: military impunity,
human rights violations and a climate of terror, social injustice and severe economic inequalities.
Such an assessment was shared by Bishop Toruno. After the last round of talks, he said, "There are
those who genuinely want to see the war end. But it is not so easy; the conflict must be brought to
a satisfactory end [by eliminating] social injustice, hunger, corruption and indifference for one's
fellow Guatemalans, which is what provoked the war" in the first place. Grisly escalation of human
rights violations Meanwhile, observers have cautioned that a wave of renewed political violence
and human rights violations in February represents a jittery response by security and paramilitary
forces to expectations raised by the Salvadoran peace treaty. On Jan. 30, the eve of the cease-fire
in El Salvador, a powerful bomb ripped through the headquarters of the University Students
Association (AEU), which had been organizing public forums on the Salvadoran peace process.
One day earlier, six leaders from the country's popular organizations, five of them affiliated with
the Union and Popular Action Unity (UASP), received death threats from a group calling itself the
"Anti-Communist Unity." Death threat targets included Amilcar Mendez of the Runujel Council of
Ethnic Communities, Byron Morales of the UASP leadership, Armando Sanchez of the Federation
of Public Employees (FENASTEG), Rosalina Tuyuc of the National Coordinator of Guatemalan
Widows (CONAVIGUA), Juan Mendoza of the Campesino Unity Committee (CUC), and Nineth
de Garcia of the Mutual Support Group (GAM). The five are among the most important popular
leaders in Guatemala who have not been killed, driven underground or forced into exile. On Jan.
31, four corpses were discovered in different places around the capital. All had been tortured and
shot in the head at point-blank range. According to the GAM, these four brought the "political
assassination" toll by death squads since Jan. 1 to 18. In January, several national and international
human rights organizations released their 1991 annual reports. Americas Watch noted a sharp
deterioration in the human rights situation last year, although it also affirmed "encouraging
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judicial progress" in investigating crimes committed by the military. The Guatemala Human Rights
Commission (CDHG) recorded 1,967 violations in 1991, including 764 extrajudicial executions.
Twenty-one trade union leaders were among the 764. The Center for Investigation, Study and
Promotion of Human Rights (CIEPRODH), the national legislature's human rights committee, and
the autonomous Human Rights Attorney General's Office all reported similar statistics. The Human
Rights Attorney General's report added that the "principal obstacles regarding human rights were
impunity and the Serrano government's lack of political will." Indeed, despite the grim evidence,
the government continues to maintain that the reports on human rights abuses can virtually be
ignored. In the words of Manuel Conde Orellana, general secretary to President Serrano, the
reports consist of "propaganda by organizations close to the URNG who are bent on slandering
Guatemala" before the international community. In late January, the foreign ministry launched a
"diplomatic offensive," sending high-level delegations to the US, Latin America and Europe, with
the aim of countering international criticism of Guatemala's human rights record. In particular,
the government fears that a condemnation by the UN Human Rights Commission in session from
Jan. 27 to March 6 in Geneva could jeopardize future economic aid from abroad. Military shakeup Despite the fears of a "Salvadoran-style" settlement, implementation of the peace process
in El Salvador, and discussion throughout the region of demilitarization and pacification (see
"Demilitarization in Central America," CAU 01/17/92 and 01/24/92) will inevitably breathe new life
into the Guatemalan talks. Recent changes in the Guatemalan armed forces high command could
also contribute to such prospects. In an audacious move last December that sparked rumors of a
possible coup d'etat, President Serrano ordered a thorough shake-up of the military's top leadership
and at command posts throughout the country. The changes included replacement of Defense
Minister Gen. Enrique Mendoza with a Serrano confidant, Gen. Jose Domingo Garcia. Serrano also
sent two generals and six colonels from the high command into early retirement and placed officers
considered loyal to him in the most important command posts in the capital and at strategic rural
garrisons. Throughout 1991 a rift had been developing between Mendoza and Serrano. Mendoza
was seen as blocking efforts to prosecute several key human rights cases, and it was widely rumored
that the US Embassy had pressured for his replacement. In addition, Mendoza had assumed an
increasingly hard-line position regarding negotiations with the URNG. Mendoza complained
bitterly that Serrano had fired him "without reason," and that his dismissal was due to pressures
from US Ambassador Thomas Strook. The new members of the high command and the new base
commanders are considered "moderates" who support military subordination to civilian rule and
negotiations with the guerrillas. The US, the Serrano government, and "moderates" within the
military who advocate a "National Stability Doctrine" (see "Guatemala: A Democratic Transition?,"
CAU 02/27/91) share the goals of reducing the military and placing it under greater civilian control,
as part of a broader project of economic and political modernization in Guatemala, and in line
with changes in US policy throughout the hemisphere. This project includes negotiations with the
URNG and some type of social "concertacion" as the only means to achieve stability. However, in
this context, peace negotiations are not seen as a vehicle to bring about fundamental reforms in
Guatemalan society, but rather as a mechanism for defusing the insurgency and integrating the
guerrillas into the existing political system. The government's position is that peace talks should
be, above all, a forum for negotiating the terms of guerrilla disarmament and reintegration into
civilian life through existing political structures. The army is convinced that it can militarily force
the rebels into accepting such an arrangement. In contrast, the URNG sees the talks as a means
to address the social, economic and political causes of the war, not unlike the Salvadoran case.
The current rebel escalation of military activity is intended to demonstrate that negotiating the
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issues which caused the war is the only viable option for peace. Fear of a Salvadoran-style peace
settlement The US suspended military aid to Guatemala in December 1990 in protest over human
rights violations. Washington called for reducing the size of the military and for instituting civilian
authority over the armed forces. The US government has also threatened to tie future economic
aid to progress in key human rights cases. However, US concern has been focused on a handful
of high-profile cases, including a US citizen Michael Devine, and Guatemalan anthropologist
Mirna Mack, whose brutal murder in mid-1990 captured international headlines. US officials have
stated that the resolution of these cases would constitute satisfactory progress in human rights
performance. The US State Department's annual report on human rights for 1991 singled out the
Guatemalan security forces as major human rights violators and criticized continued impunity.
However, the report came under fire from independent human rights monitors because of its
assertion that the situation has improved, and because State accepted the Serrano government's
claim that many assassinations and disappearances were the results of "common crime." Moreover,
the US delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission currently meeting in Geneva has opposed
a condemnation of Guatemala. During a Feb. 17 visit to Guatemala, Secretary of Defense Dick
Cheney praised the Serrano government for progress in human rights and said that military aid
might be resumed in 1993. Cheney's statements came just four days after UN special human rights
investigator for Guatemala, Christian Tomuschat, declared in a Guatemala City press conference
that he had found no indication of an improvement in human rights in 1991, and that impunity and
massacres continue. Observers in Guatemala City interpreted Cheney's visit as a sign that the US
intends to back the Serrano government in its insistence that there will be no "Salvadoran solution"
in Guatemala. The US, the Serrano administration and the Guatemalan military are united behind
the objective of stemming the growth of the URNG insurgency so as to avoid a Salvadoran-style
settlement which mandates basic socioeconomic and political reforms and opens broad space for
grassroots and leftist politics. Guatemala and El Salvador: distinct situations The context for the
Guatemalan negotiations is notably different than in the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran settlements.
At present, the most important difference between El Salvador and Guatemala is the political and
military balance between the insurgency and the popular movement, on the one hand, and the
army, government and private sector, on the other. The Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) had developed into an alternative military-political bloc, challenging the
government for hegemony over the nation and forcing a situation of dual power and inability to
govern in El Salvador. The rebels negotiated from a position of real battlefield strength, consolidated
control over a significant portion of national territory, and with a secure social base which the rebels
were capable of protecting. The URNG does not wield such military strength nor political influence.
The insurgency still operates at the level of ambushes, harassment and a "war of positions" in
the hinterland and a few other small areas around the country. The Guatemalan rebels do not
control any fixed territory, and therefore cannot provide effective protection to their social base
or accumulate forces in a stable rearguard. After a decade of civil war, the dominant bloc in El
Salvador was fractured and underwent realignment, the army was divided, and the right too weak
and isolated to impose its will or stabilize the country. Although not controlled by the rebels, trade
unions, popular movements, and center to left political parties in Salvadoran civil society had
converged with the FMLN to bring about an internal correlation of forces that left the government
with little choice but to negotiate not just the technicalities of peace, but serious changes in the
political system and the status quo. In contrast, years of naked terror and systematic repression
in Guatemala have left a desolate and chilling internal political landscape. Popular movements
are unable to organize or operate above ground. According to UN investigator Tomuschat, left
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and center civic movements are unable to participate in Guatemalan politics without constant
fear of repression. Consequently, there is no mass movement at the level of civil society and legal
politics to give resonance to the goals of democratization and basic social reform advanced by the
insurgency. Writing in Guatemalan daily newspaper Siglo XXI, political columnist Edgar Gutierrez
noted that "the asymmetry of internal forces" in favor of the status quo has become an obstacle
to progress in the Guatemalan peace talks. Such "asymmetry" has left the government and army
convinced that their opponents do not have the strength to force concessions and can be won over
to demobilization without being recognized as a belligerent force. Such issues as "the size of the
army, the formation of a joint civilian police force, or implementation of an agrarian reform (all
points in the Salvadoran settlement) are not even considered by the government as subjects for
debate" in the Guatemala talks. For this reason, the URNG views rebel military belligerence as a
key factor in bringing about the conditions that will allow for a successful negotiations process, and
for its transition from military struggle to political participation. Indeed, the November 1989 FMLN
offensive was largely credited for serving as a catalyst for the Salvadoran negotiations process which
began in earnest in April 1990. The other crucial factor in the Nicaragua and El Salvador settlements
was international pressure which played a key role in tipping the balance on several occasions in
stalemated negotiations. Such pressure in Guatemala could well provide the missing ingredient for
animating what is at this time a near-stagnant peace process.

-- End --
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